Cybersecurity Beyond IT: Why Cranes, Fire Trucks, and Embedded Controllers Belong in Your Risk Assessment

Hector R. Lopez
Sep 15
4 min read

Introduction

When most executives or boards think about cybersecurity, the images are familiar: ransomware, phishing, malware, and high-profile cyber attacks splashed across the headlines. Risk assessments usually focus on email servers, firewalls, endpoint detection, and cloud applications.

But in more than 20 years of consulting with organizations across industries, I’ve seen a consistent blind spot: the embedded controllers inside the equipment and vehicles businesses rely on every day.

These aren’t abstract systems. They include the crane controls at a construction site, the aerial ladders on fire trucks operated by municipalities, and the medical telemetry units riding inside emergency vehicles. They are critical, often connected, and frequently overlooked when leaders scope their cybersecurity risk.

Ignoring these systems doesn’t just leave a gap in compliance — it leaves a gap in resilience. In today’s governance-first cybersecurity environment, it’s time to widen the lens.

The Hidden World of Embedded Controllers

An embedded controller is a specialized computer built into equipment or machinery to manage operational functions. Unlike the laptops and servers IT teams monitor, these controllers are hidden inside physical assets: vehicles, cranes, HVAC systems, fire suppression systems, even elevators.

Originally, embedded controllers were isolated. But today, many connect wirelessly — for diagnostics, remote operation, or integration with other systems. Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, proprietary RF links, and cellular data are increasingly common.

The problem? These systems were not designed with modern cybersecurity in mind. Patching can be inconsistent. Encryption may be weak. Authentication is often nonexistent. And because they fall outside IT’s scope, they rarely appear in vulnerability scans.

According to NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: Guide to OT Security, embedded controllers are part of the same operational technology (OT) ecosystem that drives critical infrastructure. The guide highlights how programmable controllers, embedded devices, and their safety constraints must be considered in any security program.

Why Ignoring Them Creates Risk

When embedded controllers are compromised, the consequences are not limited to data. They can cascade into safety, operations, and reputation. Consider just a few examples:

Automotive exploits: Modern cars rely on dozens of electronic control units (ECUs). Researchers have repeatedly shown how attackers can remotely manipulate brakes, steering, and acceleration. Forbes recently highlighted the growing risks of vehicle cyber attacks.
Industrial cranes and PLCs: Manufacturers such as Palfinger and others now offer radio remote controls for cranes. These systems improve safety and efficiency — but they also expand the attack surface.
Emergency response vehicles: Fire truck aerials increasingly use wireless controls. E-ONE and Rosenbauer both market systems that allow operators to manage ladders and outriggers remotely, sometimes from hundreds of feet away.
Medical telemetry in vehicles: Ambulances often carry connected telemetry devices for patient monitoring and hospital integration. These save lives but, if not secured, create data and operational vulnerabilities.

These examples underscore the stakes. Embedded controllers are not theoretical vulnerabilities; they are operational choke points. If ignored, they expose organizations to downtime, liability, and in extreme cases, loss of life.

Why Security Teams Often Miss These Systems

If the risks are real, why don’t internal or external security teams include embedded controllers in their assessments? Three reasons:

Organizational silos: OT systems are often managed by facilities or operations teams, not IT. Security professionals may not even know they exist.
Assumptions of isolation: Teams assume cranes, fire trucks, or medical devices aren’t connected. In practice, wireless connectivity and IoT diagnostics change the picture.
Procurement blind spots: New equipment is often purchased without a cybersecurity review. Procurement teams focus on cost, performance, and compliance with safety standards — rarely on wireless protocols, firmware patching, or encryption.

As SANS’ OT Ransomware Framework shows, when attackers gain access to operational environments, the impacts spread faster and hit harder than in IT. Ignoring embedded devices leaves these environments dangerously exposed.

Expanding the Cybersecurity Lens

Governance-first cybersecurity means accounting for every system that can introduce risk — not just the ones that look like servers. That includes embedded and operational controllers.

This is especially critical at the point of purchase or operationalization. Leaders should ask: If this equipment introduces wireless, IoT, or remote-control functionality, what threat surface does it create?

Expanding the scope requires alignment with established frameworks:

NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) emphasizes identifying and protecting all critical assets, including OT.

ISA/IEC 62443-2-1: Security Program Requirements for IACS Asset Owners defines what organizations should require in their security programs when adopting new industrial or operational systems (ISA/IEC 62443 Series).

ISA/IEC 62443-2-4: Requirements for IACS Service Providers specifically addresses secure configuration, remote access, and wireless communications — the very features embedded in cranes, fire trucks, and medical telemetry.

These standards make it clear: industrial and operational systems can no longer be treated as “out of scope.” They must be part of the cybersecurity strategy services leaders implement.

BravoCheck Perspective: What We’ve Seen

At BravoCheck, we’ve worked with organizations that already had external cybersecurity firms or in-house security teams. Across sectors — from municipal services to construction to healthcare logistics — the same pattern emerged: embedded controllers were never on the risk register until we raised the issue.

For example:

A municipal client with strong network security controls had never considered the wireless aerials on its fire trucks.

A construction firm had invested heavily in phishing training, but the crane control systems on its sites had default, unencrypted wireless links.

A healthcare provider had purchased connected telemetry, without asking a single question about data security or wireless access.

These blind spots weren’t the result of negligence. They were the product of narrow definitions of “cybersecurity” and procurement processes that never included a cyber lens.

What sets BravoCheck apart is a JD-led, ANSI-accredited, DoD-approved approach to governance. Our authority isn’t theoretical — it’s grounded in decades of guiding boards, executives, and public leaders to expand their view of cyber risk.